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COMMENTS
SALES OF ANOTHER'S MOVABLES-HISTORY,
COMPARATIVE LAW, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
Certain recurring conflicts arise between men that any
system of law must seek to resolve. When justice and reason
fail to indicate one best solution to such a conflict, different
legal systems may well reach different results. Although these
different results are often supported in the technical terms or
theory of the legal system involved, the actual decision to favor
one party over the other in such a situation is basically one of
policy.' This comment deals with the often arising conflict between one who is owner of a movable and one who has acquired
it without the owner's consent. Under some circumstances, justice and reason clearly favor one party and in these situations
the different legal systems have no difficulty reaching common
results. In other situations, however, the conflict is not so easily
resolved and it is then that the policy behind the law will dictate
2
different results.
The Louisiana law governing this conflict between owner
and possessor has felt the influence of several legal systems.3
To understand the current Louisiana law and the role that each
of these systems has played in shaping it, it is first helpful to
see how each resolved the conflict and the reasons behind that
resolution.
COMPARATIVE SYSTEMS

Roman Law
Early in Roman law the Twelve Tables 4 recognized acquisition of ownership by prescription.5 This obviously tended to
1. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 591 (1932) ; Charmont,
The Conflict of Interests Legally Protected in French Civil Law, translated in
13 ILL. L. REV. 461 (1919).
2. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 106 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1966) ; Note, 6 LA. L. REV. 731, 732 (1946).
3. Frankiln, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vayt
Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REv, 589, 604 (1932); Comment, 4
TUL. L. REv. 78 (1930).

4. The Twelve Tables codified existing Roman law about 450 B.C., F. WALTON, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 98 (4th ed. 1920).
5. This acquisitive prescription of immovables or movables was known as
usucapio. Later, in the Justinian law, this term was used to designate the acquisi-

tion of movables only. 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD § 646,
at 216 (1917). It provided for full, or quiritary, ownership. Id. § 573, at 150. The
prescriptive period required was only one year but special rules suspended the
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protect the party in possession. The Roman law did provide a
means for the owner of a movable out of possession to establish
his ownership if the prescriptive period had not run, 6 but even
if the owner was successful in this action it did not guarantee
7
the restitution of his property to him.
By the Classical Period8 of Roman law the rules for acquisitive prescription of movables were more refined although
still based on the principles of the Twelve Tables. It was necessary for one claiming ownership by prescription to establish
good faith, just title, and possession of the movable for one
year. 9 During this period the basic action available to an owner
out of possession to recover his property, both movable and immovable, was the rei-vindicatio or revendicatory action. 10 The
per sponsionem form of this action decided only the question of
ownership but the per formulam petitoriam form allowed a
decree ordering restitution of the property." If the owner could
not maintain a rei-vendicatio action because he did not have
full ownership, 1 or if the one in possession of the property
did not claim full ownership, other actions were available.'9
Thus during the Classical Period of Roman law there were
means by which the dispossessed owner of a movable was protected, but the complexities of the actions and the short oneyear prescriptive period tended to protect the possessor rather
4
than the owner.'
running of time for stolen things. M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 106 (Dannenbring transl. 1965). For a general discussion of what was considered stolen in
Roman law, see 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WoIRLD § 824, at

377 (1917).
6.

This action, called legis actio sacramento in rein, was set forth in the

Twelve Tables and is described in M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 112 (Dannenbring transl. 1965).
7. Id. at 113.
8. The Classical Period extended from about the time of Christ to the mid-

dle of the third century A.D., 1-. WOLFF, ROMAN LAW 103 (1951).
9. See generally M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 1.06
1965). There it is pointed out that the good faith (bona
(iusta causa) required by Roman law are not identical with
for these terms.
10. For a general discussion of real actions at Roman
NOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY § 121, at 371

11.

(Dannenibring transl.
fides) and just title
the modern meanings
law, see 1 A. YIAN-

(1966).

Id. Even here, however, damages were often available as an alternative.

At. KASEa, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 115 (Dannenbring transl. 1965).

12.

Full, or quiritarian,ownership was necessary to bring the action. 1 A.

YIANNOPOUIOS, Civi. LAW OF PROPERTY § 121, at 374 (1966).

13. The proper action if the one seeking to recover goods possessed an interest less than full ownership was the actio Publiciana. The action available to an
owner against one who claimed only a usufruct or similar interest in the property
was the actio negatoria. M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 117 (Dannenbring
transl. 1965).
14. While these actions were available to recover movable property, they
probably found their greatest application in cases involving immovables. Id.
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At the time of Justinian, 15 however, two changes took place
that shifted the protection of the law. The acquisitive prescription of a movable 16 continued to require a thing capable of being
acquired by prescription, good faith, and a just title, but in
addition the period of possession necessary was lengthened
from one to three years.' If the requirements of good faith or
just title were not met the period of possession necessary was
thirty years. 8 In addition the Justinian legislation strengthened
the revendicatory action so the owner could better pursue his
property during the prescriptive period. The action was extended to apply to those who had formerly possessed but then
fraudulently parted with the property 9 and the remedy became
an enforceable judgment of specific restitution. 20 On the whole
the Roman law described by the Corpus Iuris Civilis provided
a system that protected the dispossessed owner. 2' Some security
of transaction was provided, however, for the possessor in good
faith and just title who had possessed for three years or for
a possessor without these qualities who had possessed for a
thirty-year period.
French Law
The oldest rules of French law governing the conflict between owner and possessor seem to originate in the Germanic
customs rather than the Roman law.2 2 The customs did not
allow a real action such as the rei-vendicatio of Roman law but
they did provide a contractual action against one to whom the
owner had entrusted his property."8 In addition, if the property
had been stolen, actions of a penal nature allowed the owner
to regain his property even from a third party.2 4 Except in this
15. The Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian was completed between 528 and
534 A.D., H. WOLFF, ROMAN LAW 163 (1951).
16. The term usucapio by this time was used exclusively to refer to the acquisitive prescription of movables. 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN
WORLD § 646, at 216 (1917).
17. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 106 n.1 (La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1966) ; M. KAsER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 108 (Dannenbring transl.

1965).
18. M. KASER, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 108 (Dannenbring transl. 1965).
19. Id. at 1.14.
20. 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY § 121, at 374 (1966).
Even then, however, the owner may have had to settle for damages.
21. 2 AUBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANQA1S § 183, at 106 n.1 (La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1966).
22. Id.; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATiSE No. 2461 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959).
23. 1 I'LANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE No. 2462 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
This action, however, was only available against the one to whom the property
had been entrusted and did not apply to a third party who had acquired from him.
24. Id.; 2 AuBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 107 n.1 (La. St.
L. Inst. transl. 1966).
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case, however, the early French law did not protect the owner
against third persons in possession.
By the fifteenth century the renaissance of Roman law
began to influence local French customs

25

appeared. 26

and the revendictory

action again
Planiol states it appeared as early as
the fourteenth century and that by the sixteenth century it was
established that an owner could follow his property regardless
of how he had lost possession. 27 This rule was adopted by the
city customs and particularly by the Custom of Paris which
appeared in 1580.28 A policy of law giving owners such extensive rights, however, soon began to meet opposition in a
society that was becoming more commercial. Although most
customs stated no prescriptive period for the owner's revendicatory action, French courts began to provide some security
of transactions by limiting the period during which the owner
could bring the action. 29 Many adopted a limit of three years

apparently based on Justinian's rule of three-year acquisitive
prescription of movables.3° In addition, jurists returned to the
old view that the action was not available at all against a third
party when the owner had voluntarily parted with possession.2 1
Finally, security of sales transactions triumphed completely
over security of ownership, and revendication was denied except
in cases of lost or stolen goods. 2 This change was reflected by
the maxim "En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre" which
was codified in Article 2279 of the Code Napoleon. 2 Thus the
French law, after initially adopting the Roman view protecting
25. H. WOLFF, ROMAN
26. 2 AUBREY ET RAU,
Inst. transl. 1966).

27. 1

LAW 183, 193 (1951).
DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS

PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE

§

183, at 107 n.1 (La. St. L.

No. 2466 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.

1959).
28. Id.; 2 AURY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 107 n.l (La. St.
L. Inst. transl. 1966).
29. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE No. 2468 (La. St. L. Inst. transi.
1959).
30. Id.
31. Id. No. 2469.
32. Id.; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 106 (La. St. L.
Inst. transi. 1966).
33. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2279 continues: "Ndanmoins celui qui a perdu
ou anquel it a dtd vol une chose peut la revendiquer pendant trois ans, a computer du jour de la perte ou du vol, contre celui dans les mains duquel it 1a
trouve; sauf e celui-ci son recours contre celui duquel il la tient."
FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2279 (Wright's transl. 1908): "With reference to
movables, possession is considered equivalent to a title. But a person who has
lost or who has been robbed of something can bring an action to recover it against
any person he finds in possession thereof within three years of the date of the
loss or robbery, and the latter has his right of action over against the person from
whom he received it."
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ownership, was forced to abandon it. 34 The rule finally settled
upon was much like the original Germanic law, although it
could hardly be said to be based upon it. Rather it evolved from
commercial pressures in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen3 5
turies.
Having adopted this rule, the French had little trouble
drafting complementary articles to implement it fully and provide such exceptions to it as justice and reason demanded. The
French Code began with the basic rule that "with reference
to movables, possession is considered equivalent to title. ' 36 The
exception was then immediately added that if the owner lost
the movable or it was stolen from him he had a period of three
years during which he could recover it from anyone he found
in possession. 37 Even during this three-year period, however,
the possessor was protected if he acquired the property "at a
fair or market or at a public sale, or from a merchant selling
similar articles."38 Then the original owner could not demand
possession thereof except on condition of paying the person in
possession the price he paid for it.
The French law distinguishes the situation where the owner
has voluntarily parted with possession from the instance where
he has been dispossessed involuntarily. 39 In the former case, although the owner retains all actions he may have against the
person to whom he surrendered possession, 40 he has no real ac34. Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut
Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REv. 589, 593 (1932).
35. Id.; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE No. 2469 (La. St. L. Inst. trans].
1959).
36. FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 2279. This article has been described as one of
the most important provisions of French law by both French and Louisiana
writers. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE No. 2459 (La. St. L. Inst. trans].

1959) ; Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut
Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 593 (1932).
37. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2280. The Code does point out that the person
in possession then has his right to recover from the person from whom he received the property. Id. art. 2279.
38. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2280 (Wright's transl. 1908). This article also
specifies the same rule applies to a lessor who seeks to recover movables taken
without his consent and bought under similar circumstances.
39. See generally AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 112 (2d
ed. 1963). In addition, the French law distinguishes some movables where article
2279 does not apply at all: incorporeal movables, movables of the public domain,

movables of historical value, ships, river boats over 20 tons, and airplanes. Id.; 2
AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS § 183, at 108 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1966) 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE Nos. 2489, 2490 (La. St. L. last.
transl. 1959).

40. Actions which the owner could bring include a contract action for restitution or the real action of revendication which would allow the owner to specifically recover his property. AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW

113 (2d ed. 1963).
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tion against a third person who acquired possession in good

faith.41 In the latter case, the owner preserves his right of revendication against the finder or the thief 42 and in addition he
has a real action that he can bring within three years 43 against
a third party in possession of the thing lost or stolen even if the
third party acquired in good faith.4 4 The harshness of this rule
against an innocent third party is softened by the fact that the
term "robbed" is interpreted strictly 4s and the provision of Article 2280 requires reimbursement of the innocent possessor if he
acquired the goods at a fair, market, public sale, or from a merchant dealing in such goods.4e
Although it is clear the French law protects security of sales
transactions, French jurists disagree as to the proper theoretical explanation for the rule of Article 2279. 47 Since it is included
in Title XX of the Code Napoleon, "Of Prescription," and more
particularly in Chapter V, Section 4, headed "Of Various Periods of Prescription," it is argued by some that article 2279
provides for an instantaneous prescription. This explanation is
rejected by Planiol48 and Aubry and Rau,49 however, as being a
contradiction in terms since "acquisition by prescription pre41.

For a discussion of the good faith requirement implied in French Civil

Code article 2279 see AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION To FRENCu LAW 113
(2d ed. 1963) ; 2 AUnRy ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 111 (La. St.
L. Inst. transl. 1966) ; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no 2479 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1959) ; 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY § 127, at 386, 388

(1966).
42. This real action of revendication only expires after 30 years. 2 AUBRY ET
RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 183, at 115 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966). The
owner may also have a personal action in tort that prescribes after ten years in
the case of indictable theft (a crime) or three years in the case of simple theft
(at misdemeanor). AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION To FRENCH LAW 114 n.1 (2d
ed. 1.963) ; 1 PLANIOL, CIVII. IAW TREATISE No. 2484 (La. St. L. Inst. trans.
1959).
43. The -time is counted from the day of the loss or theft. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIl,
LAW TREATISE No. 2485 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
44. Id.; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 183, at 115 (La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1966).
45. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 113 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1966) ; Note, 25 TuL. L. REV. 146, 148 (1950). A strict interpretation
naturally brings fewer cases within this exception to the general rule that possession is considered equivalent to title.
46. The possessor himself must have bought it under such circumstances. It
is not enough that some intermediate possessor did so. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 116 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966).
47. See generally 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 183, at 107 n.1
(La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966) ; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 2493-2496
(La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) ; 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 127, at 388 (1966) ; Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La
PossessionVaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 594 (1932).
48. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no 2494 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
49. 2 AUaRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 183, at 107 n.1 (La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1966).
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supposes a certain period of time has elapsed." 50 Another theory
holds that through Article 2279 the law simply creates a special
means of acquiring ownership.5 1 This explanation is subject to
the criticism that it does not explain how the law does this but
merely describes the result of the law in operation. 2 The explanation apparently favored by the more prominent French writers53 is that Article 2279 creates an irrebuttable presumption of
ownership in favor of the possessor. Upon closer examination,
however, even this explanation appears to be only a rationalization for the result the French codifiers wished to achieve.
Whatever may be its rationale, the end result of the French
law today is to favor the possessor of a movable to the exclusion
of the dispossessed owner in all but a few situations. These exceptions to the general rule, cases of loss or theft, are merely
those where common ideas of justice dictate some protection for
the owner and even in these cases the owner's remedy is not
absolute. Further, the history of the rule and its incongruity with
the French law protecting ownership in immovables indicates it
evolved in response to the needs of a commercial society.21 Its
origin can best be found in reasons of policy rather than strict
French legal theory.
Spanish Law
The rules on acquisitive prescription of movables now found
in the Spanish Civil Code 5 5 are similar to the rules of Justinian
but to say they originated there would be a gross oversimplification. Certainly Roman law was the dominant influence in Spain
while Rome governed that peninsula,56 but following the expulsion of the Romans by the Visigoths new laws and codes were
introduced.57 The same pattern was repeated when the Arabs
entered Spain in the eighth century.58 Since in each case portions of the old laws remained and mixed with the new, Spanish
law came to be a complexity of often conflicting and over50. Id.
51.

1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no 2495 (La. St. L.

Inst. transl. 1959).

52. Id.

53. Id. no 2496; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 183, at 107 n.3
(La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1966).
54. See Charmont, The Conflict of Interests Legally Protected in French
Civil Law, 13 ILL. L. REV. 461, 467 (1919).
55. See SPANISH CIV. CODE arts. 1940, 1941, 1955, 1956.
56. The Roman domination in Spain extended from before the time of Christ
until about the year 466 A.D., 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, Preface by translators iv
(Lislet & Carleton transl. 1820). A historical outline of Spanish law can be found
in G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (1851).
57. G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 24 (1851).
58. Id. at 61.
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lapping codes and customs. 59 The leading effort to introduce
order into this system was the publication of Las Siete Partidas
by Alphonso the Learned in 1263.60 It was not until almost a
century later, however, that this code or digest was accepted
throughout Spain."6
The Institutes of Justinian greatly influenced Las Siete Par62
tidas, especially the third partidas dealing with prescription.
When Las Siete Partidaswas read with other Spanish laws still
in effect, the result was to allow an owner to reclaim his property
6
for a period of three years even from a good faith possessor. 3
If the owner had lost his goods, or they were stolen from him,
the period was lengthened to thirty years.6 4 No exceptions based
upon the good faith possessor's mode of acquisition were made.
Basically, these same rules were retained in 1889 when a
new Civil Code was promulgated in Spain to supersede the
existing mass of laws.' 5 Article 464 of that Code appears to
establish a new rule by stating that "the possession of personal
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title thereto," 66
but this is immediately qualified by adding that if the owner
"has lost personal property or has been unlawfully deprived of

it" he may recover it "from any person possessing

it."67

The

good faith possessor is protected only to the extent that if he
purchased the property "in good faith at a public sale" the owner
must reimburse him the price he paid. 8 In addition, Article 464
must be read with other articles which provide that open possession, 6' in good faith and with a just title,7° confers ownership by prescription only after three years."' In the absence of
59. 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, Preface by translators vi (Lislet & Carleton
transl. 1820).
60. Id. at vii; G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 69, 74
(1851).
61. G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 74 (1851).
62. Id. at 70, 71; 1 LAs SIETE PARTIDAS, Preface by translators vii (Lislet

& Carleton transl. 1820) ; Comment, 4 TuL. L. REV. 78, 83 (1930).
63. Asso Y DEL RIO, INSTITUTES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN 108 (Johnston
transl. 1825) ; 2 LAS SIFTE PARTIDAS L. 19, tit. 5, p. 5 (Lislet & Carleton transl.
1820) ; G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO arts. 1365, at 288,
and 1374, at 290 (1851).
64. G. SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO art. 1378, at 291
(1851).

65. F.
vi (4th
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

FISHER, THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN WITH PHILIPPINE NOTES,

ed. 1930).
Id. art. 464.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 1941.
Id. art. 1940.
Id. art. 1955.

Preface

19691

COMMENTS

these qualities a six-year period is required,12 with the exception that a thief or robber cannot acquire by prescription until
the penal and civil liabilities for his crime have also been barred
by prescription.73 Therefore the Spanish law today remains
consistent to its Roman tradition as expressed in Las Siete Partidas and protects security of ownership rather than commercial
transactions.
Common Law
Just as the codifications of Roman, French, and Spanish
law stated general maxims and then qualified their application
with exceptions that the codifiers felt justified, so the body of
case law in England established first a general rule and then
exceptions to it. The courts founded their exceptions upon
equitable principles, the most important of which deal with
fraudulent conveyances and equitable estoppel. Since these exceptions were tailored on a case by case basis,7 however, the
equities of different factual situations led to more exceptions
and often to artificial distinctions between situations.
The basic rule of the English common law in dealing with
the conflict between a good faith possessor of goods and their
original owner was that the buyer of goods obtained no better
title than the seller himself possessed. 5 Thus generally one who
purchased from a thief, even if he did so in good faith, could not
prevail against the true owner.76 Just as similar rules in the
French city customs did not long prevail, however, a policy as
harsh as this on English commercial transactions did not survive
long without exceptions.
The exceptions in English law arose to protect purchasers
who were genuine innocent parties." Since the law was faced
with a conflict between two parties, the owner and the purchaser, either of whom in other circumstances would have an
interest the law would protect, it was imperative that the purchaser be truly in good faith if he was to prevail at all.7 8 Those
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 1956.
74. See generally P. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 10 (3d ed.
1955).
75. N. ROTWEIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY

§

55,

at 46 (1949);

2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 310, at 240 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 77 C.J.S. Sales
§ 291, at 1099 (1952).
76. N. ROTWEIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 55, at 46 (1949);
Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 497 (1923).
77. L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES § 79, at 401 (2d ed. 1959).
78. See generally 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 745, at 19 (5th ed. 1941).
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purchasers who were in good faith came to be grouped under
the title "bona fide purchasers" and certain requirements evolved
which a purchaser had to meet to fall within that group.
The rule most often stated was that in order for one to
qualify as a bona fide purchaser he must have purchased in good
faith, without notice, and for a valuable consideration.7 9 Thus
one who acquired as a gift,8s or at a grossly inadequate price,,'
or with notice that the seller was not the true owner 2 could not
qualify as a bona fide purchaser. Even if one did qualify as a
bona fide purchaser, however, that alone did not exempt him
from the general common law rule that the buyer of goods
3
obtained no better title than the seller possessed.
The first exception to the general rule arose in connection
with goods purchased at certain chartered county fairs or
markets.' 4 These were called "market overt '8 5 and the commonlaw principle became that a bona fide purchaser in market overt
obtained valid title even as against the original owner. 6 Later
this exception was extended to include sales in the cities made by
shops that regularly dealt in such goods.8 7 The need for security
of commercial transactions obviously influenced the courts in
creating this exception."8 Such fairs or chartered markets never
became common in the United States, however, and although
America had its share of shopkeepers, the American common79. Id.
80. Beeson v. Byars, 187 Ark. 966, 63 S.W.2d 540 (1933) ; Kohn v. Burke,
294 Pa. 282, 144 A. 75 (1928).
81. Tinnin v. Brown, 98 Miss. 378, 53 So. 780 (1910) ; Strong v. Strong,
128 Tex. 470, 98 S.W.2d 346 (1936).
82. Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 So. 773 (1887) ; Craig
Brokerage Co. v. Joseph A. Goddard Co., 92 Ind. App. 234, 175 N.E. 19 (1931).
But c. Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W.2d 978 (1949) ; Russell Willis,
Inc. v. Page, 213 S.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 627 (1948).
83. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 311, at 241 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 77 C.J.S.
Sales § 291, at 1099 (1952).
84. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 347, at 347 (rev. ed. 1948).
85. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (4th ed. 1951) : "Market Overt. In English law, an open and public market. The market-place or spot of ground set apart
by custom for the sale of particular goods is, in the country, the only market
overt; but in London every shop in which goods are exposed publicly to sale
is market overt, for such things only as the owner professes to trade in"
86. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 347, at 347 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 46
AM. JUR. Sales § 462, at 625 (1943).
87. See note 86 supra; BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (4th ed. 1951). Note
the similarity 'between the situations embraced by the common law doctrine of
market overt and the words of FRENCE CIv. CODE art. 2280 (Wright's transl.
1908) : "[A] fair or market or at a public sale, or from a merchant selling similar
articles...."
88. L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES § 78, at 392 (2d ed. 1959).
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law jurisdictions never adopted the English doctrine of market
overt.8 9
Other exceptions to the general rule that even a bona fide
purchaser acquires no better title than his vendor arose in
England and were accepted by the American courts.90 If the
object of the sale was negotiable itself, as in the case of money
or bank notes, overriding considerations of negotiability precluded the application of the general rule.91
Another exception also accepted in American common law
jurisdictions arose when the seller obtained goods from the
original owner by fraud. Generally, if the seller obtained property by fraud he received not a void title but a voidable one. 92
Thus if the seller sold to the bona fide purchaser before the
owner voided this title the bona fide purchaser received a valid
title and would prevail against the owner."' Although this principle seems logical enough, rather technical distinctions arose as
the courts applied it to factual situations. 94 If the seller obtained
merely the possession of the property by fraud he had no title
at all and thus the owner would prevail against the bona fide
vendee95 If he obtained title to the goods by fraud, as in a case
where he fraudulently induced the owner to sell the goods to him
by misrepresentation or impersonation, he obtained a voidable
title and the bona fide purchaser would prevail.9 6 Traditionally
a distinction was made at common law between fraudulent sales
made face to face and sales made at a distancef' In the former
case, title passed because of the fictional intent imputed by the
court to the seller to vest title in the person physically before
him. In the latter case, no title passed because there was an in89. ld.; Note, 27 Micn. L. -tEV. 218 (1929); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 293, at
1100 (1952).
90. See generally 3 J. POMiEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 735, at 3 (5th ed. 1941) ; N. ROTWEIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 56,
at 47 (1949) ; 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 310, at 240 (rev. ed. 1948).
91. N. Ro UwEIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 56, at 47 (1949) ; L.
VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES

§ 78, at 392 (2d ed. 1959).

92. N. ROTWEIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 58, at 48 (1949).
93. Id.; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 294, at 1101 (1952).
94. These distinctions are criticized in Franklin, Security of Acquisition and
of Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase,6 TUL. L. REV.
589, 594, 607 (1932).
95. United States v. Barnard, 72 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Tenn. 1947) ; Swartz
v. White, 80 Utah 150, 13 P.2d 643 (1932).
96. Moore v. Long, 250 Ala. 47, 33 So.2d 6 (1947); Thomas E. Hogan,
Inc. v. Berman, 310 Mass. 259, 37 N.E.2d 742 (1941).
97. 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 635, at 444 (rev. ed. 1948).
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tent to vest title in a certain person but not in the person who
actually took possession. 9
This emphasis upon title also affected cases involving conditional sales. 99 If an owner sold goods and reserved only a
security interest, the buyer received title and thus he could pass
it on to a bona fide purchaser. 100 If, on the other hand, an owner
only conditionally sold goods and reserved the title in himself,
he would prevail against a subsequent bona fide purchaser.1 0'
Courts of equity in England also found ways to circumvent
the traditional common law rule which was often harsh on the
innocent purchaser. Their decisions were not based on distinctions between void and voidable title but rather on the equitable
principle of estoppel. Thus if the original owner of goods had
acted in any way to preclude himself from attacking a bona fide
purchaser's title, the bona fide purchaser would prevail.12 An
example of this would be if the original owner had clothed the
seller with some indicium of ownership or authority to sell the
property in question. 1 0 3 Indicium of ownership might be found
in some document such as an invoice or in statements made in
the presence of others, but merely putting another into possession was generally not held sufficient to deny the owner his
property.1 0 4 It was also necessary that he create some apparent
power in the seller to dispose of the goods and that the pur1 5
chaser rely on that power. 0
As these distinctions were applied to actual cases it was
98. This was the often criticized common law distinction between sales inter
praesentes and sales inter absentes. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of
Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TuL. L. REV.

589, 607 (1932) ; Note, 23 TUL. L. REv. 420, 421 (1949).
99. N. ROTWEIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 59, at 49 (1949);
2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 324, at 265 (rev. ed. 1948).

100. Wooten v. Carrollton Acceptance Co., 103 Fla. 237, 137 So. 390 (1931)
Freemen v. Kraemer, 63 Minn. 242, 65 N.W. 455 (1895).
101. Weinstein v. Freyer, 93 Ala. 257, 9 So. 285 (1891) ; Bousquet v. Mack
Motor Truck Co., 269 Mass. 200, 168 N.E. 800 (1929). In England and most
American states, however, this general rule has now been modified by recording
statutes. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 327, at 276 (rev. ed. 1948).
102. M. BIGELOW, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 607 (6th ed. 1913) ; 2

S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 312, at 242 (rev. ed. 1948). This is apparently
based on the equitable maxim: "When one of two innocent persons must suffer by
the act of a third person, he who put it in the power of the third person to

inflict the injury shall bear the loss." L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES § 30, at 117
(2d ed. 1959).
103.

(1949)

J. L. McClure Motor Co. v. McClain, 34 Ala. App. 614, 42 So.2d 266

(owner allowed seller to have automobile title papers) ; Lasser v. Phila-

delphia Nat'l Bank, 321 Pa. 189, 183 A.2d 791 (1936)
property with owner's consent).

(seller displayed owner's

104. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALE OF GOODS § 313, at 244 (rev. ed. 1948), and cases
there cited.
105. N. ROTWFIN & C. PHILLIPS, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 57, at 47 (1949).
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inevitable that different courts would decide upon different rules
in almost identical factual situations.0 ° In addition, these exceptions to the general rule became so numerous that it was
often difficult to remember they were just exceptions. Some
writers have even referred to the "bona fide purchaser doctrine" as stating a rule of common law and treated as exceptions to that rule the cases in which the original owner prevailed over the bona fide purchaser. 10 7 The entire area presented
many difficult problems for the American common-law courts
but many of the most difficult ones were rendered moot by the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in those states.
The Uniform Commercial Code
Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-403 provides in Subsection one:
"(A) person with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have
been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser
has such power even though
"(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the
purchaser, or
"(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored, or
"(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash
sale," or
"(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law." °8
Subsection two provides that "[a] ny entrusting of possession
of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
the ordinary course of business."109
Subsection one greatly simplifies the problem of a court faced
with a case where possession was secured by fraud, a bad check,
or similar means. In keeping with the Uniform Commercial
Code objective of promoting security in business transactions, the
good faith purchaser for value is protected in these cases. Be106. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 324, at 265, § 325, at 269 (rev. ed.
1948) (different rules applied to conditional sales) ; L. VOLD, THE LAW OF SALES
§ 30, at 172 (2d ed. 1959) (different rules applied to bad check sales).
107. Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 420, 421 (1949).
108. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403 (1).
109. Id. §2-403(2).
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cause subsection one is limited to cases of purchase where there
is at least a voidable title, however, the rule remains unchanged
that one who purchases from a thief is not protected against
the claim of the true owner.
Subsection two covers many situations the courts formerly
disposed of on principles of equitable estoppel. Subsection two
goes further, however, and extends the estoppel doctrine to
"[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind." 110 Thus it appears, for example,
that if one entrusts a family heirloom with a jeweler for repair
and the jeweler customarily sells jewelry, the owner will be
denied the right of asserting his ownership against a bona fide
purchaser for value. The rule is obviously drawn to protect commercial transactions, but it is also rigid and unflexible. Courts
operating under the Uniform Commercial Code no longer have
the opportunity to weigh the relative equities of particular cases,
but instead must apply the hard and fast rule. Whether the
courts will in the future apply it faithfully is an unanswered
question.
THE LOUISIANA LAW

Sources
The sources of the Louisiana Civil Code provisions governing
the conflict between possessor and owner are an anomaly. The
pertinent Civil Code articles are found in sections dealing with
the contract of sale and the acquisitive prescription of property.
In both of these areas the Louisiana law borrowed heavily from
the French Code yet on this issue the French influence is conspicuous in its absence. The crucial article in the French Code,
Article 2279, provides that "[w]ith reference to movables, possession is considered equivalent to a title." This was not followed
in the Louisiana codification. Instead the Digest of 1808 provided
that "[i]f a man has had a public and notorious possession of
a movable thing, during three years.... the property becomes
vested in the possessor, unless the thing has been stolen.""' Since
it is inconceivable the redactors of the Louisiana law could have
overlooked the French article, the logical conclusion must be
that they considered the French view and rejected it. If this is
true, their decision could hardly be considered other than one of
basic policy. They were not bound by theory as they were drafting a new code, and, in fact, the French Code which was their
110. Id.
111. La. Civ. Code bk. 111, tit. 20, ch. 3, § 3, art. 75, at 488 (1808)
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506).

(now
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model 1 2 dictated a contrary result. It is interesting to note,
however, that while they rejected the maxim of Code Napoleon
Article 2279, the influence of that article can still be found in
other Louisiana code articles copied from the French.' 13 Lou-

isiana Civil Code Article 1922,114 for example, was taken from
the French Code and assumes the presence of Article 2279.
Similarly the failure to recognize a chattel mortgage in Louisiana until modern times can be traced to French jurisprudence
which in turn was based on Article 2279.15

If the redactors of the Digest of 1808 considered and rejected
the French doctrine, upon what then did they base the Louisiana
law? It may be that the Louisiana Code articles were based upon
the ideas found in the customs of the French cities, especially
the Custom of Paris. 1 ' This view is strengthened by the fact
that the redactors of the Louisiana Code must have been familiar
with the French doctrinal writers and their commentaries on
these customs." 7
The more likely explanation of the Louisiana Code articles,
however, is that they were based on the Spanish law in effect
in Louisiana when the Digest of 1808 was compiled., The
primary provisions of that law dealing with property were found
in Las Siete Partidas.119 The Louisiana codifiers were familiar
with this and in determining a basic policy question such as the
conflict between security of ownership and security of transaction it is not surprising they looked to and adopted the law then
112.

The generally accepted view is that the Louisiana jurists had available a

copy of the French Civil Code as adopted in 1804 rather than just a projet of it.
J. Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, in CiviL CODE OF LOUISIANA xiii, XX (2d
ed. Dainow 1961).
113. Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REv. 589, 601 (1932).
114. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1922: "With respect to movable effects, although, by
the rule referred to in the two last preceding articles, the consent to transfer vests
the ownership of the property in the obligee, yet this effect is strictly confined
to the parties until actual delivery of the object. If the vendor, being in possession,
should, by a second contract, transfer the ownership of the property to another
person, who gets the possession before the first obligee, the last transferee is
considered as the owner, provided the contract be made on his part bona fide,
and without notice of the former contract." Cf. FRENCHR CIv. CODE art. 1141.
115. See Daggett, The Chattel Mortgage in Louisiana, 16 TExAs L. REV.
162 (1938).
116. Comment, 4 TUL. L. Ruv. 78, 81 (1930).
117. Id. at 81, 83 n.19.
118. Id. at 80, 82; Note, 4 TuL. L. REv. 146 (1930). See 1 LAS SIErS
PARTIDAS, Preface by translators xviii (Lislet & Carleton transl. 1820) as to
the force of the Spanish laws in Louisiana at the time.
119. The importance of Las Siete Partidas to the early Louisiana jurists is
emphasized in 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, Preface by translators (Lislet & Carleton
transl. 1820). The full title of this translation is The Laws of Las Siete Partidas,
Which are Still in Force in the State of Louisiana.
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in effect. Las Siete Partidas2 0 definitely implied the owner could
recover his goods and specified the remedies available to an innocent purchaser. It also provided that movables could be acquired by prescription," but this was qualified by a provision
which specified that the possessor acquired ownership only after
12 2
three years uninterrupted good faith possession with just title.
It declared further that after three years the original owner
could no longer recover his goods unless they were stolen, lost,
or taken from him by violence.1' In these cases the owner could
recover within thirty years.1 2 4 The similarity between the provisions of Spanish law and Article 3506 of the Louisiana Code
can readily be seen. Both provide that a possessor acquires
ownership only after three years and then only if he meets certain requirements and the goods in question were not lost or
stolen.
Having departed from the French law to adopt the principle
now found in Louisiana Civil Code Article 3506, the Louisiana
codifiers quickly returned to the French Code and copied Article
76 of the Digest of 18081"' almost verbatim from Code Napoleon
Article 2280. These articles provide that even if the property
were lost or stolen, if the possessor acquired it at a public market,
fair, auction, or from one dealing in such goods, the original
owner cannot recover his property without reimbursing the
possessor the price he had paid. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Louisiana redactors, having settled on a principle
in Article 3506, which was harsh to possessors in good faith,
were willing to relax that strict rule and afford the possessor
some degree of protection if he had purchased in certain open
markets.2 6
Although neither the Code Napoleon nor the Digest of 1808
dealt further with the subject, the code revision of 1825 added
2 7
two articles to the Louisiana law. Article 3474 of that Code1
created an exception to the general rule of security of ownership by protecting the purchaser of stray animals or lost mov120. 2 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS L. 19, tit. 5, p. 5 (Lislet & Carleton transl. 1820).
121. 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS L. 4, tit. 29, p. 3 (Lislet & Carleton transl. 1820).
122. 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS L. 9, tit. 29, p. 3 (Lislet & Carleton transl. 1820).
123. Id.
124. 1 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS L. 21, tit. 29, p. 3 (Lislet & Carleton transl.
1820).
125. La. Civ. Code bk. III, tit. 20, ch. 3, § 3, art. 76, at 488 (1808) (now
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3507).
126. By copying the wording of the French provision so closely, however, the
Louisiana redactors created a problem in interpreting the Louisiana articles. See
text at note 135 infra.
127. Now LA. Civ. CODE art. 3508.
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ables which had been sold by authority of law. Article 3475128
protected security of transactions after ten years in all cases
by providing that uninterrupted possession for that period
was sufficient to acquire ownership even without good faith
or just title. The addition of these articles can be logically explained as concessions to the need for security of transactions
1 29
which was beginning to be felt in Louisiana even then.
Although the source of the Louisiana law in this area is not
certain, it seems that after considering and rejecting the French
policy the redactors of 1808 codified the existing Spanish law
in Louisiana which protected security of ownership. This was
tempered somewhat by the adoption of Article 2280 of the Code
Napoleon and modified further in 1825 to offer some protection
to transactions. The decision of 1808 not to accept the French
view that "possession is considered equivalent to a title" was
basically one of policy and it is the foundation upon which the
present code structure rests.
The Present Louisiana Code Structure
The Louisiana Civil Code definitely protects security of
ownership at the expense of security of transactions. Article
2452 states that "[t]he sale of a thing belonging to another
person is null" and implies the true owner can recover his
property by specifying that an innocent buyer would then have
a claim for damages against the seller. Article 496 makes it
clear that the possession of a thing and the ownership of it are
distinct so that an owner does not part with ownership by merely
parting with possession of his property unless it is for a period
sufficient to allow the possessor to acquire ownership by prescription. Article 3506 provides that the period of possession
necessary to acquire ownership of movables is at least three
years. To acquire in this period certain requirements must be
met: the possessor must have possessed "in good faith and by
a just title, as owner .... during three successive years without
interruption"'130 and the property must not have been lost or
stolen from the original owner. If any of these requirements are
not met, Article 3509 provides that ten years possession is
needed to acquire ownership.
Article 3507, while not affecting the rule of Article 3509 that
128.

Now id. art. 3509.

129. No doubt French commentators writing on the Code Napoleon also
exerted an influence. See Dainow, The Louisiana Civil Law, in CIVIL CODE OF
I.OUISIANA xxiii (2d ed. Dainow 1961).
130. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3506.
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ownership of lost or stolen movables is acquired only after ten
years, does provide that in the event the possessor of such
property bought it "at public auction or from a person in the
habit of selling such things,""' the true owner must reimburse
the possessor the price he paid in order to reclaim it. From the
words of Article 3507132 it would seem that the duty to reimburse
arises and protects the purchaser as soon as he acquires the
property. This is the view given to the corresponding Article
22801" in France.1 3 4 In France, however, Article 2280 must be
read with Article 2279,1 and the two together provide that possession of lost or stolen movables is not considered equivalent to
title but the owner can reclaim them only if he reimburses the
possessor.36 Louisiana, however, did not adopt the maxim of
Code Napoleon Article 2279 but rather provided the three-year
prescriptive period of Article 3506. If Article 3507 were interpreted as giving rise to an immediate right to reimbursement in
Louisiana as it does in France, therefore, the possessor who
bought lost or stolen goods at an auction or from a person in the
habit of selling such goods would be in a better position than a
possessor who bought goods not lost or stolen under similar
circumstances."- This incongruity results from the Louisiana
codifiers adopting Article 2280 of the French Code while rejecting Article 2279 upon which it depends. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, to avoid this unintended result, rule that the provisions of
Article 3506 must be considered as part of Article 3507; therefore the right of the possessor to demand reimbursement does
not arise until after he has had possession for three years." 8
While this interpretation of Article 3507 is inconsistent with its
source, it is necessary to prevent inconsistency within the Lou1 9
isiana Code itself.
131. Id. art. 3507.
132. Id.: "If, however, the possessor of a thing stolen or lost bought it at
public auction or from a person in the habit of selling such things, the owner of

the things can not obtain restitution of it, without returning to the purchaser the
price it cost him."
133. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2280.
134. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAw TREATISE n 2486 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959) ;2 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANAIS § 183, at 115 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1966) ; Comment, 4 Tnt. L. REV. 78, 79 (1930).
135. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 2279.
136. 2 AunRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 183, at 115 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl. 1966) ; 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no 2486 (La. St. L. Inst. transl.
1959).
137. Comment, 4 TUL. L. REV. 78, 84 (1930). See also Security Sales Co.
v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928).
138. Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928),
citing with approval Campbell v. Nichols, 11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845) and Davis v.
Hampton, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 288 (La. 1826).
139. See note 138 supra. See also Comment, 4 TuL. L. REV. 78, 84 (1930).
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Finally, the Louisiana Code still provides as it did in 1825
that purchasers of stray animals or lost movables sold by authority of law will be protected in their possession even against
the true owner. 40 The need for security of judicial sales justifies
this rule today just as it did in 1825.
Modern Legislation
In addition to the Louisiana Civil Code articles, there has
been recent legislation protecting the security of commercial
transactions and the good faith purchaser from liens that may
have been placed upon movables by the original owner. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:710 provides:
"[H] olders of chattel mortgages on motor vehicles, chattels,
property or merchandise of any nature or kind who expressly
or impliedly consent to such chattels being placed on sale
by the owner thereof in the State of Louisiana in the usual
course of business shall be precluded from asserting the said
mortgage or the lien created by it against bona fide retail
purchasers in actual good faith of said motor vehicles, chattels, merchandise or property."
Holders of the mortgages are deemed to have impliedly consented
whenever the mortgagor is a wholesaler, retailer, or dealer duly
licensed to sell the type of chattel or merchandise covered by the
mortgage.'41 In protecting the security of transaction in such
cases the legislature has placed a greater burden on the lending
institutions by forcing them to rely on personal surety contracts
and to make more frequent inventory inspections.
There is other recent legislation which would seem to affect
the conflict between original owner and good faith purchaser
in cases involving motor vehicles but the Louisiana courts have
ruled otherwise. Louisiana Revised Statute 32:705 provides:
"[No] person shall sell a vehicle without delivery to the purchaser thereof, whether such purchaser be a dealer or otherwise, a certificate of title issued under this Chapter in the
name of the seller with such signed endorsement of sale and
assignment thereon as may be necessary to show title in the
purchaser ......
Revised Statute 32:706 further provides:
140. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3508.
141. Cf. LA. R.S. 9:5354 (1950) for the rule as to all chattel mortgages.
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"[No] person buying a vehicle from the owner thereof,
whether such owner be a dealer or otherwise, hereafter shall
acquire a marketable title in or to said vehicle until the
purchaser shall have obtained a certificate of title to said
vehicle. .. "
With the adoption of this legislation it was argued that it
changed the provisions of the Civil Code on completion of a sale.
The jurisprudence answered this contention by stating that the
motor vehicle legislation did not make the sale of a motor vehicle
void if the transfer was not executed in conformity with the
statute, but simply caused the title to be imperfect until the certificate was acquired. 142 Thus the failure to comply with the
provisions of Revised Statutes 32:705 and 706 does not prevent
the passage of title nor does it preclude the bona fide purchaser
from prevailing.
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE

Historical Development
The first mention of the common-law exceptions in the Louisiana jurisprudence was not in relation to movables, but in
cases concerning fraudulent conveyances of slaves, immovable
by operation of law. 1 43 Miles v. Oden,14 concerning a Kentucky
contract, cited the rule of Fletcher v. Peck14 5 "that a bona fide
purchaser is not affected by fraud in his vendor, who has a legal
title to the property sold. 1 4 6 This was a recognition of the
common-law rule that a purchaser in good faith for a valuable
consideration and without notice of the prior adverse claims is
protected against certain suits by the holders of such claims. In
this case the bona fide purchaser acquired from one who had
title, although fraudulently acquired, and the intervention of the
third party bona fide purchaser cut off the rights of the original owner. However, in that case the court recognized the rule
only as the law "under which this transaction took place," that is,
Kentucky.147 But later that year the same court apparently applied the rule to a Louisiana sale of slaves. 4 8 Subsequent deci9
sions continued to recognize the rule.14
142. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957).
143. LA. CIv. CODE art. 461 (1825).
144. 8 Mart.(N.S.) 214 (La. 1829).
145. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
146. 8 Mart.(N.S.) 214, 227 (La. 1829).
147. Id.
148. Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 341 (La. 1829).
149. Russel v. Favier, 18 La. 585 (1841). Plaintiff delivered a slave under
contract of hire to Bruner who sold to defendant in New Orleans. The court held
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In the early nineteenth century cases involving transfers of
true movables, the Louisiana courts tested the bona fide purchaser's rights according to the standard of the common law exception concerning fraudulent acquisitions, 15° but were reluctant
to raise the equitable issue of estoppel. Thus where movables
consigned for shipment were sold by the consignee, the original
owner was protected because no title passed, but no inquiry was
made as to the presence of such indicia of ownership pointing
to an estoppel.,1
The doctrine of equitable estoppel was acknowledged in the
case of Moore v. Lambeth 5 2 as having been "frequently recognized in our jurisprudence. '' 153 The court described the doctrine
as the situation where one man who has title stands by and
either encourages or does not forbid the purchase by another, in
which case he will be precluded from later asserting his ownership. In this case, however, the court found no estoppel. By midnineteenth century the courts faced the increasing problem of
unauthorized sales and pledges of goods shipped to New Orleans as part of the expanding river commerce. The problem of
the conservatism of the Civil Code was reflected by the remarks
of one justice in his review of the record of the district court:
"The learned judge kept the case for a long time under advisement, under the hope, as he states in his opinion, that
his researches would lead him to some legal ground on which
relief might be extended to the defendants, as he considered
it essential to the security of commercial dealings and to the
protection of good faith. ''1 54
In supplying the theory sought by the lower court, the court
turned to the common law authorities and found that the original owner allowed a dealer to hold himself out as the ostensible
owner and thus allowed third persons to rely on that action. This
was the first decision to deprive the original owner of his movable property because of equitable estoppel.",
that no title passed in the Mississippi sale; therefore plaintiff recovered the slave

and defendant recovered his purchase price under warranty resulting from the
Louisiana sale. Barfield v. Hewlett, 4 La. 118 (1832). Slaves had been delivered
under contract of hire to one Harraldson who sold them at public sale. The court
said: "It is clear the defendant acquired no title, his vendor having none himself,
nor any authority to convey any."

150. E.g., Marks v. Landry, 9 Rob. 525 (La. 1845) (raft of timber).
151. Campbell v. Nichols, 11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845) (carriage).
152. 5 La. Ann. 66 (1850).

153. Id. at 74.
154.
155.

Fullerton v. Kennedy, 6 La. Ann. 312 (1851).
See text accompanying note 102 supra.
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Whereas this latter case expressly found no agency relationship between the parties, the case of Conner v. S. L. Hill &
Co., 1 6 decided the same year, applied the doctrine of estoppel to
the unauthorized act of an agent. In that case the plaintiff sent
his son with a flatboat load of corn to New Orleans for sale.
The son returned to Tennessee after having represented his
helper, Allen, as his partner with authority to sell the corn
which he represented as theirs. Allen sold the boat and produce
and absconded with the proceeds. Holding for the defendant the
court said, "The plaintiff has lost his property by his own imprudence in confiding it to the inexperience of his son without
responsibility, and must bear the loss, rather than impose it
upon innocent third persons."'' 1 5 7 Citing one of the salve cases,1 58
the court pointed out how an owner may be estopped from reclaiming his property from a bona fide purchaser by having voluntarily placed in the hands of another the indicia of ownership
and exhibited him as having the power to dispose of it. Although
Conner v. S. L. Hill & Co. has been declared effectively overruled by one decision, 159 which is distinguishable on the facts, it
nevertheless has been cited in the recent jurisprudence. 160
Also discernible from the history of the jurisprudence are
two other general categories of cases: (1) those dealing with
the authority of cotton factors to pledge cotton or warehouse
6
receipts, 16' (2) and those dealing with sales of automobiles.' '
Both lines of decisions will be discussed more fully below. By the
end of the nineteenth century the courts had recognized that the
French doctrine of possession vaut titre was not part of our
156. 6 La. Ann. 7 (1851).
157. Id. at 8.
158. Moore v. Lambeth, 5 La. Ann. 66 (1850).
159. Holloway v. A. J. Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
160. In Conner the court found enought indicia of ownership and apparent
authority to estop the original owner, whereas in the Holloway case there was no
such evidence. See William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 125 La. 1013, 52 So. 131 (1910)
James v. Judice, 140 So.2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
161. Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897) (rice)
Laland v. His Creditors, 42 La. Ann. 705, 7 So. 895 (1890); Stern Bros. v.
Germania Nat'l Bank, 34 La. Ann. 1119 (1882); Young v. Scott, 25 La. Ann.
313 (1873) ;Tatum v. Wright, Williams & Co., 7 La. Ann. 358 (1852) ; Leverich
v. Richards, 1 La. Ann. 348 (1846). See text accompanying note 195 infra.
162. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957) ; Jeffrey Motor Co.
v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So.2d 369 (1956); Fisher v. Bullington, 223 La.
368, 65 So.2d 880 (1953) ; Packard Fla. Motors Co. v. Malone, 208 La. 1058, 24
So.2d 75 (1945); Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45
(1929); Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 138 (1922);
Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So.2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962); James v. Judice, 140 So.2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Hub City
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law'63 and that the vacuum must be filled by the exceptions provided by the common law.
Stolen Goods
Where stolen goods have been sold to a bona fide purchaser,
the courts are uniform in their application of the general rule
that the sale of another's property is a nullity. The only problem which has concerned the courts is that of defining the term
stolen. Of particular difficulty is that of the forged or dishonored check. At common law the crimes of theft by fraud and larceny were separate and distinct, the latter requiring a trespass
in the taking." 4 With the liberalization of statutory definitions
of theft in modern times, the trend has been to include both of
these crimes under one general definition of theft.165 The result
was a confusing line of cases in the Louisiana jurisprudence
which was not clarified until recent years. In the case of sale of
goods stolen by acts amounting to common law larceny, the
courts have readily applied the rule of Article 2452 and have
protected the original owner where no prescriptive rights were
at issue.166 In the case of theft by fraud the first response of the
court was also to protect the original owner, applying both the
broad definition of the theft rule and the rule that the bona fide
purchaser is not protected when the thing transferred has been
stolen. 1 7 The State Supreme Court finally realized the harshness of such an application of the criminal statute in the case of
Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins65 in which it held that the broad
definition of theft for purposes of criminal prosecution does not
alter the provisions of the Civil Code and other civil statutes relating to sales and the transfer of title. Thus where a bona fide
purchaser might otherwise be protected, the fact that his vendor
is guilty of theft (by fraud) will not deny him protection.
Common Law ConditionalSales
Related to the problem of theft by fraud is that of the soMotors, Inc. v. Brock, 71 So.2d 700 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ; Port Fin. Co. v.
Ber, 45 So.2d 404 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950). See text accompanying note 183
infra.

163. Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897).
164. Cf. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950) (comment).
165. Id.
166. E.g., Davis v. Hampton, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 288 (1826) (stolen horse)
Lynn v. Lafitte, 177 So. 83 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) (cotton stolen from fields).
167. Fisher v. Bullington, 223 La. 368, 65 So.2d 880 (1953) ; Security Sales
Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1929) ; Hub City Motors, Inc. v. Brock,
71 So.2d 700 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ; Port Fin. Co. v. Ber, 45 So.2d 404 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1950). See also Packard Fla. Motors Co. v. Malone, 208 La. 1058,
24 So.2d 75 (1945).
168. 230 La. 857, 89 So.2d 369 (1956).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

called common law conditional sales contract. The common law
conditional sale is a secured transaction whereby title remains
in the vendor until the purchase price is paid even though the
vendee is owner for all other purposes." 9 At common law the majority rule was that the bona fide purchaser does not prevail
over the conditional vendor because no title passed under the
conditional sale. 17 0 This rule, however, did not deny the applicability of equitable estoppel where other evidence of apparent
ownership was present.
A majority of American jurisdictions also held that a cash
sale with payment by check is a conditional sale and that title
remained in the vendor until the check cleared the bank. 17 ' Prior
to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code many states
had taken steps to abrogate the harshness of this rule by requiring recordation of conditional sales contracts in order to
protect innocent third party purchasers. 7 2 Under the UCC the
problem is solved by the provision that "a person with voidable
title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser
for value ... even though ... the delivery was in exchange for
a check which is later dishonored.' ' 17 3 The result achieved under
result that the Louisiana courts have long
the UCC is the same
74
since recognized.'
Louisiana is not faced with the many problems surrounding
common law conditional sales because its courts have consistently refused to recognize them under our law. In Barber Asphalt
Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co. 17 5 the court held that a contract which purports to reserve title of a movable in the seller
and yet delivers possession to the buyer will be read as though
the condition were nonexistent and that title passes to the buyer.
Although the court relied on a technical and logical analysis of
the basic principles of sales, the true basis for its holding was a
policy decision not to permit sales of movables in which the
buyer receives possession but not title. The court also pointed
out that it would not allow the parties to circumvent the law at
that time prohibiting chattel mortgages by the use of an instrument which had practically the same legal effect. But even when
the legislature provided legislation allowing the use of the chat169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

L. VOLD, THE LAW
Id. at § 30.
Id.
Id. at § 59.

OF

SALES

§ 57

(2d ed. 1959).

COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
See text accompanying note 187 infra.
121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
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tel mortgage, the courts retained the old rule as to common law
conditional sales, probably because Louisiana had no legislative
safeguards concerning their use, namely recordation requirements.' 6 Louisiana, however, does allow conditional sales for
immovables under its bond for deed legislation which includes
7
the needed safeguards.'
In spite of the fact that conditional sale contracts are not
recognized when contracted in Louisiana, the courts, through
comity, have recognized such sales executed in other states, even
against a bona fide purchaser, where the object has been removed
to Louisiana without the knowledge or consent of the vendor."1
Where, however, the removal to Louisiana is with the knowledge
or consent of the vendor, the conditional sale is not recognized. 17 9 Because our neighboring states have adopted the U.C.C.,
which requires recordation for most conditional sale, contracts,
especially automobiles,18 0 this rule is even stronger as applied to
automobiles sold under a conditional sale. 8"
Fraudulent Acquisitions and Dishonored Checks
At common law, the general rule was that the buyer of
goods obtained no better title than the seller himself had. The
first exception to this rule is the case of a sale of movables acquired by fraud. In such case the court protected the bona fide
purchaser for valuable consideration if title had been in his
vendor even though the title was voidable. The acquisition by
the bona fide purchaser cut off the right of the original owner
to attack the voidable title. One of the earliest cases, other than
the slave cases, to apply this rule was Freeport& Tampico Fuel
Corp. v. Lange. 8 2 Plaintiff sold to Snider a load of brass and
scrap iron, Snider misrepresenting himself as the agent of a
reputable dealer. At the same time Snider arranged to sell the
same load to the defendant and even arranged for the defendant
176. The reason the French never allowed the chattel mortgage was because
of their doctrine of possession vaut titre and the lack of technical recording
machinery. -See text accompanying note 33 supra.
177. LA. R.S. 9:2941 (1950).
178. Finance Security Co. v. Conway, 176 La. 456, 146 So. 22 (1933);
Overland Texarkana Co. v. Bickley, 152 La. 622, 94 So. 138 (1922) ; Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Victor Motor Co., 33 So.2d 703 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948)
Hinton Co. v. Rouse, 4 La. App. 471 (Orl. Cir. 1926).
179. Fisher v. Bullington, 223 La. 368, 65 So.2d 880 (1953) ; Finance
Security Co. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939); American Slicing
Machine Co. v. Rothschild & Lyons, 12 La. App. 287, 125 So. 499 (2d. Cir. 1929).
180. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
181. See Pacific Fin. Loans v. Guidry, 69 So.2d 56 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953)
(foreign chattel mortgage).
182. 157 La. 217, 102 So. 313 (1924).
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to pick it up from the plaintiff's place of business in a truck
bearing the defendant's name. The court cited common law authority and reasoned that because plaintiff did not intend to
vest title in Snider and because the falsely alleged principal did
not obtain title, the original owner should prevail. Furthermore
the court rejected a plea of equitable estoppel because it found
no indicia of ownership other than mere possession.
Another case concerning the problem of fraudulent impersonation was Port Fin. Co. v. Ber.183 Plaintiff, a Lake Charles automobile dealer, sold an automobile to Dupuis, who impersonated a reputable citizen of Marksville, Daugat, and who forged a
check in Daugat's name. Defendant, a New Orleans used car
dealer, purchased the automobile and made the check payable to
Daugat. The court found the defendant in good faith, but nevertheless protected the plaintiff on the theory that the first transaction constituted theft. Under the present jurisprudence the
fact that the act was theft under the criminal law has no applicability to the question whether title passed.11 As an alternative
basis for its decision the court held that the original owner
should prevail because he did not intend to vest ownership in
the flesh and blood of Dupuis. The court cited the common law
rule as to fraudulent sales made face to face and then misapplied it. Under the common law rule the bona fide purchaser
would prevail because in such a case the fictitious intent of the
18 5
vendor is to vest title in the person before him.
Another situation involving the issue of whether title has
passed is where a check has been given in payment in a cash
sale and is later dishonored. At first the courts defined it as
theft and protected the original owner under Civil Code Article
8 6
2452; but in Jeffrey Motors Co. v. Higgins,
the court rejected
the theft analogy and held that the acceptance of a post-dated
draft (by two days) converted the transaction into a credit sale.
Later decisions have held that acceptance of a check later dishonored converts a cash sale into a credit sale and that title
passes. '18 Although the courts use the term "credit sale," their
primary concern is finding that title passes in order to protect
the bona fide purchaser for value. By liberalizing the law of
sales, the jurisprudence avoided accepting the common law rule
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
Chevrolet

45 So.2d 404 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950).
See text accompanying note 168 supra.
See text accompanying note 97 supra.
230 La. 857, 89 So.2d 369 (1956).
Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957); Trumbull
Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So.2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962.)
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that payment by check creates a conditional sale. The UCC has
made the same modification based on the same equitable principles."'
Estoppel-Agency, Apparent Authority, and Apparent
Ownership
The other major exception to the general rule of property that
the buyer receives no better title than the seller himself possessed
is that of equitable estoppel l s9 Although applied only in rare
situations, it offers a handy tool to the court where the equities
lie with the bona fide purchaser. Louisiana courts have often
displayed tendencies to confuse the doctrine of estoppel with
that of fraudulent sales and to misapply the rules peculiar to
each. 90
Many of the Louisiana decisions involve agency relationships
which have been breached by the agent. Searching for solutions
to these agency problems, Louisiana courts looked outside of the
code provisions on mandate and turned to the common law rules
of agency, especially those concerning apparent authority. Although Civil Code Article 2985'91 states that a procuration or
power of attorney is an act by which one person authorizes another to act "in his name," Sentell v. Richardson-' held that
the words "and in his name" are not essential because otherwise
there would be no power of an attorney to buy property for an
undisclosed principal. Thus where an agent is authorized he has
the power to bind his principal by such authorized act even
though the principal is undisclosed.
Difficulty arises where the agent acts beyond his authority.
Courts use the term "apparent authority" to describe the situation where the principal by his conduct causes a third person to
reasonably believe that a particular person has authority to enter into negotiations or to make representations as his agent. 1 3
The legal writers distinguished between apparent authority and
agency by estoppel, pointing out that the latter doctrine applies
only where there has been a detrimental reliance by the third
person. 94 But the courts often use the terms synonymously or
fail to make a clear distinction between them. Another distinc188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See text accompanying note 108 supra.
See text accompanying note 102 supra.
E.g., Flatte v Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957).
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2985.
211 La. 288, 29 So.2d 852 (1947).
W. SAvEY, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8 (1964).
Id.
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tion they often fail to make is that between apparent authority
and apparent ownership, the latter of which applies where there
is no agency relationship or where the agent having possession
of a movable does not act as agent, but as owner. If the owner
clothes the agent with such indicia of ownership, or apparent
ownership, and a bona fide purchaser relies on it to his detriment, the owner might be estopped from asserting his ownership. If a court finds estoppel based on apparent ownership the
fact that the seller is an agent is irrelevant because technically
the protection afforded the bona fide purchaser does not arise
out of the agency relationship.
As a general rule, an agent given possession of a movable
and authority to deal with it has the power to bind the principal
by a transaction of the kind authorized, but not otherwise. 195
Thus a factor authorized to sell by a disclosed or undisclosed
principal is not, however, authorized to pledge goods entrusted
to him.196 If the movable is put in the possession of a dealer
given limited authority to sell, Louisiana courts have held the
owner bound by a sale beyond the agent's apparent authority.
In General Finance Co. v. Veith, 19 7 plaintiff placed a car in the
possession of a dealer, his agent, for sale subject to plaintiff's
approval. The dealer sold the car as agent but acted beyond his
authority because the sale had not been approved. Holding for
the defendant bona fide purchaser, the court found that the
agent had apparent authority and that the plaintiff had clothed
him with such authority that he was estopped from denying the
authority. This decision is in line with the common law authorities. 1911
In James v. Judice,19 defendant's father delivered an automobile to a dealer with the understanding that if the dealer sold
it he could take as his commission any amount over $250. The
dealer sold the automobile as owner, not as agent, and disappeared. Plaintiff, the buyer, brought suit to have defendant deliver the certificate of title, which his father had withheld with
195. Id. at § 66.
196. Lalande v. His Creditors, 42 La. Ann. 705, 7 So. 895 (1890). Cf.
Maxwell v. W. B. Thompson & Co., 175 La. 252, 143 So. 230 (1932) ; Holton
v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897). See Conant, The Objective
Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and the Estoppel of Apparent Ownership,
47 NE. L. REV. 687 (1968), for a discussion of the effect of the nineteenth century
factors acts designed to treat this problem. See LA. R.S. 9:4342, 4343 (1950) for
legislation regulating factors dealing with agricultural products.
197. 177 So. 71 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
198. Cf. W. SEAVEY, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8 (1964). See Hammond Fin.
Co. v. Carter, 83 So.2d 682 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
199. 140 So.2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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the intention of delivering it to the dealer when he made the
sale. The court held that the dealer was the defendant's agent
with both actual and apparent authority, and that he was estopped from setting aside the acts of the agent. Such a result is
difficult to understand based on the rules of agency and apparent authority because in this case the agent did not disclose that
he was acting as agent. There can be no apparent authority
where an agent does not disclose his principal. What really influenced the court was that the dealer had apparent ownership,
not apparent authority, upon which the bona fide purchaser relied to his detriment.
Sometimes it is difficult for the court to find a true agency
relationship between the parties, as in the case of William
Frantz Co. v. Fink,20 0 where the plaintiff entrusted to Moss the
possession of two pair of earrings with the understanding that
if Moss could find a buyer he could sell the earrings and keep
whatever profit he earned over the fixed price upon payment of
that price. If, however, Moss could not find a buyer, he had the
option of returning the earrings. The court said that the law of
agency could play no part in this case nor did title pass to Moss.
It also pointed out how surrendering mere possession of a movable is not of itself sufficient "indicia of ownership" to estop
the original owner from asserting his ownership. But in this
case Moss was no ordinary individual, he was both an artisan
and a merchant of jewelry, and the court held that the surrender
by plaintiff of the earrings to such a person was clothing him
with sufficient indicium of ownership to estop the plaintiff.
Whether conduct of the owner has been such to give the bona
fide purchaser legal justification for believing that the possessor
is owner depends upon whether the owner delivered to the possessor some evidence of ownership in addition to possession (indicia of ownership). Usually this evidence must be more than
mere possession, but possession itself might be enough indicium
of ownership where, as in the Fink case, the possessor is a
dealer in such things and is authorized to transfer ownership.
Fink is unusual in that it upheld a plea of estoppel. Other cases
decided after it rejected such pleas on weaker facts. 20 1 In Holloway v. A. J. Ingersoll,202 the plaintiff, a Negro of limited knowledge and experience, was persuaded by Cobb, a grocer, that
200. 125 La. 1013, 52 So. 131 (1910).
201. Cf. Freeport & Tampico Fuel Oil Corp. v. Lange, 157 La. 217, 102 So.
313 (1924), discussed at note 180 supra.
202. 133 So. 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
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Cobb could secure a better price for his cotton from a special
buyer and that plaintiff should store his cotton in Cobb's warehouse until the buyer arrived. The warehouse was not Cobb's at
all, but belonged to the defendant. Plaintiff went with Cobb and
was present when Cobb delivered and sold the cotton to defendant in Cobb's name. Cobb later gave to the plaintiff a receipt
stating that his cotton had been stored in Cobb's warehouse. The
court justifiably rejected the plea of estoppel and applied Civil
Code Article 2452.
Recent Decisions
Recent decisions of the courts tend to confuse the doctrine of
estoppel with the rules relating to fraudulent acquisitions and
conveyances. In Flatte v. Nichols, 20 3 plaintiff, a Texas automobile dealer, sold to Murphy, a Mississippi dealer, an automobile
which had no title papers except a receipt for a Texas license,
the reason being that the Texas certificate of title had not yet
been issued. Plaintiff delivered to Murphy the car and the license receipt and a notarized invoice-bill of sale stating that
there were no notes and "conditioned" sale contracts held by
plaintiff. In return Murphy gave a bad check. Murphy sold the
automobile to defendant in Louisiana, passing to him the invoice
received from plaintiff and the muniments of title in Mississippi. The court applied Louisiana law to the Mississippi contract,
ignoring arguments that it was a conditional sale, and held that
it was a credit sale and that title had passed. It further found
that plaintiff had clothed Murphy with every possible indicia
of ownership, knowing fully that he was a dealer and would resell the automobile. Because the court found that title had passed
it was unnecessary for it to discuss whether plaintiff had
clothed Murphy with any indicia of ownership, because such an
inquiry relates to whether there is evidence of estoppel. The
same is true for Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell 24
where the court found a valid sale and then proceeded unnecessarily to use the language of estoppel.
Thus the only recent decision in which a plea of estoppel has
been upheld is James v. Judice, discussed above. In that case, as
in Fink, possession was entrusted to a dealer in such things. A
dealer was also involved in the first case to uphold a plea of
equitable estoppel, Fullerton v. Kennedy, 20 decided in the nine203. 233 La. 171, 96 So.2d 477 (1957).
204. 142 So.2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
205. 6 La. Ann. 312 (1851). See text accompanying note 154 supra.
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teenth century. Only in Conner v. S. L. Hill and Co. 20 6 has the
plea of estoppel been upheld where the possession was not by a
dealer, but there the possessor was an agent who disclosed his
agency to the buyer.
CONCLUSION

From the jurisprudence is discernible two general categories
of cases: (1) those in which title has passed, including the bad
check cases and the fraudulent impersonation cases, and (2)
those in which no title has passed but in which has passed some
indicia of ownership other than mere possession.
In the bad check cases, the Louisiana courts have ignored the
majority common law rule as to conditional cases and found that
title passed under a credit sale. Because title passes, a bona fide
purchaser for value is protected against claims by the original
owner. By so finding, the courts rule out the applicability of
Article 2452 because the movable no longer belongs to "another." But the courts have not cited any legislation as grounds for
affirmatively protecting the bona fide purchaser. They have
failed to recognize other articles of the Code which contain remnants of the doctrine of possession vaut titre and which form a
legislative basis for protecting the third party purchaser in the
bad check cases. Article 3229207 gives the seller the right to redeem movables delivered under a sale not made on credit where
the price remains unpaid, but only so long as the movable remains in the possession of the purchaser. If the purchaser has
sold the movable, the seller loses his right in the thing. This article applies to cash sales in which the price has not been paid.
Although the courts have said that the bad check sales are credit
sales, the real intent of the parties in such a transaction is to
make a cash sale, thereby bringing the bad check sales within
the scope of the article. Even though the redactors of the Code
omitted the general rule of possession vaut titre, it was retained
as to sales of movables not on credit in which the price has not
been paid. If the courts would apply Article 3229 in the future,
the result would be much more consistent with the Code and
would avoid unnecessary use of common law terminology. 20
206. 6 La. Ann. 7 (1851). See text accompanying note 156 supra. For a
treatment of the problems of apparent authority and apparent ownership from the
agency side, see Conant, The Objective Theory of Agency: Apparent Authority and
the Estoppel of Apparent Ownership, 47 NR. L. REV. 678 (1968).
207.
208.
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In cases involving fraudulent impersonation, our courts have
been hesitant to protect the bona fide purchaser. One court went
so far as to cite the common law rule as to face to face transactions and then to misapply it. The reason for the misapplication
was that the court saw the rule only as a tool of logical analysis
and not as a statement of policy merely clothed in the language of
intent. The true basis for the rule is that because of his conduct
the original owner was less deserving of protection than the
bona fide purchaser. The intent language is used to distinguish
the situation where the sale is made at a distance and the parties are not dealing face to face. In such a situation the courts
have favored the original owner because otherwise sellers would
hesitate to deal at a distance and commerce would be adversely
affected. Finding a legislative basis for protecting the bona fide
purchaser in cases of fraudulent acquisitions would be difficult
because of the lack of a general rule that possession equals title.
Regardless, the courts seem hesitant to protect the third parties
in these cases, thereby making the question more moot than real.
In the cases involving possession with certain indicia of ownership, there is no legislative basis for admitting the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. Through jurisprudential evolution Louisiana
courts have employed the doctrine of equitable estoppel to protect bona fide purchasers who acquired from dealers who deal
in that type of movable. Although the courts have confused the
law of agency (apparent authority) with the law of sales (apparent ownership), they have reached the proper result. This result is in line with UCC and also in accordance with the principle of possession vaut titre.
What Louisiana courts have done, therefore, is to adopt principles from the common law which protect innocent third parties
in particular instances, and by applying these rules achieve the
same result as would have resulted under the French law in
these instances. The beneficial result of this development is that
it allows the courts to be selective in their protection and avoids
the harshness of possession vaut titre in cases where the original owner has surrendered nothing more than mere possession
of his movables. In such cases the original owner rightfully
should be protected and has been under our jurisprudence.
P. Michael Hebert and James R. Pettway

